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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND
BIODIVERSITY: THE INDUSTRIALIZATION
OF NATURAL RESOURCES AND
TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE
MARK RITCHIE,*
KRISTIN DAwKUNs**
MARK VALLIANATOS**
Intellectual property rights ("IPRs") entitle the inventor or the
corporation which files a claim on the inventor's behalf, the exclu-
sive right to make, use, and sell a new product or process technol-
ogy, usually for a period of seventeen to twenty years.' Generally,
IPRs take the form of patents, trademarks or copyrights and tra-
ditionally have fallen under the domain of national law. Individ-
ual countries throughout the world have adopted different IPR
laws, in an attempt to balance the interests of industry's desire to
capitalize on its investments in technological development with
society's rights to benefit from the knowledge and the resources of
its country.2 Under the new rules of the Uruguay Round of Gen-
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ternational Public Law from the University of Amsterdam in the Netherlands in 1994.
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icy. She is a graduate of Antioch College and holds a Master's Degree from Massachusetts
Institute of Technology in City Planning, specializing in International Environmental
Negotiation.
•** Mr. Vallianatos is a Fellow with the International Department of Friends of the
Earth. Formerly, he was an Associate of the Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy's
Intellectual Property and Biodiversity Project. Mr. Vallianatos received his B.A. Degree
from the University of Virginia in 1992 and his J.D. Degree from the University of Virginia
School of Law in 1995.
1 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(aX2) (1994) (authorizing "issue of patent" granting 20 year monop-
oly to patent holder from date on which application for patent was filed in United States);
see also Frank Emmert, Intellectual Property in the Uruguay Round: Negotiating Strategies
of the Western Industrialized Countries, 11 MicH. J. INT'L L. 1317, 1364 (1990) (stating that
patents generally are protected for 15-20 years depending on national laws).
2 See Craig Edgar, Note, Patenting Nature: GATT on a Hot Tin Roof, 34 WASHBuRN L.J.
76, 79-80 (1994) (discussing general policy of patent grants); see also Emmert, supra note 1,
at 1364; J.H. Reichman, The TRIPs Component of the GATTs Uruguay Round: Competitive
Prospects for Intellectual Property Owners in an Integrated World Market, 4 FoRDHAM IN-
TELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 171, 176 (1993) (noting that traditional handling of intellec-
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eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"),3 all member coun-
tries must conform their national IPR laws with certain provisions
of the GATT agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property
Rights ("TRIPs").4 The GATT's TRIPs provisions will undoubtedly
alter the manner in which plants, animals, and other biological
resources are used for agricultural and pharmaceutical purposes.5
The TRIPs Agreement embraces an industrial model whereby the
products of scientific research become the private property of its
corporate sponsors.6 The new rules developed during the Uruguay
Round are in conflict with many existing national laws7 and the
traditions of many agricultural and indigenous communities,
where knowledge of the nutritional and medicinal uses of plants
and the results of plant breeding are shared as a community
resource.
8
Part I of this Article will discuss how the TRIPs Agreement
threatens national sovereignty, Third World development, and
human health. Part II will examine two alternative legal regimes
tual property issues are being undermined because of rise in information-based technology
and development of growing capacity of manufacturers in developing countries); Lester I.
Yano, Comment, Protection of the Ethnobiological Knowledge of Indigenous People, 41
UCLA L. REv. 443, 458 (1993) (discussing importance of native persons' knowledge of
plants).
3 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT]; Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay
Round of Trade Negotiations, GATT Doc. MTN/FA & Add. 1 (Dec. 15, 1993); 33 I.L.M. 1
(1994).
4 GATT, Multilateral Trade Negotiations (The Uruguay Round): Agreement on Trade
Related Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Dec. 15, 1993,
33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs]. See generally Ralph Oman, Intellectual Property
After the Uruguay Round, 42 J. COPYRiGHT Soc'y U.S.A. 18, 19-25 (1994) (providing back-
ground of events leading up to Uruguay Round, including history of prior attempts to use
trade leverage to further intellectual property protection goals).
5 See Shayana Kadidal, Note, Plants, Poverty, and Pharmaceutical Patents, 103 YAiE
L.J. 223, 224-25 (1993) (discussing general impact of GATT and TRIPs on use of indigenous
resources); see also Yano, supra note 2, at 476-78 (discussing general shortcomings of Con-
vention of Biological Diversity).
6 See TRIPs, supra note 4, pmbl. The TRIPs agreement recognizes that intellectual prop-
erty rights are private rights. Id.; see also VANDANA SHVA, BioDIVERSrrY AND INTELLEcTuAL
PROPERTY RIGHTs, THE CASE AGAINST FREE TRADE 108, 115 (1993). The author, an Indian
scholar, has noted that this wonderfully presumptuous TRIPs clause "excludes all kinds of
knowledge, ideas, and innovations that take place in the intellectual commons-such as in
villages among farmers, in forests among tribals, and even in universities among scien-
tists." Id. "TRIPs is, therefore, a mechanism for the privatization of the intellectual com-
mons, and a de-intellectualization of civil society, so that the mind becomes a corporate
monopoly." Id.
7 See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (allowing patent holder to obtain patent by fulfilling certain
requirements); see also Edgar, supra note 2, at 78-79 (noting that many Third World na-
tions are unhappy with intellectual property harmonization provision in GATT agreement).
8 See Kadidal, supra note 5, at 224 (recognizing that benefits of plant breeding are
shared by members of community); see also Yano, supra note 2, at 448-49 (same).
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for managing biological resources and their possible conflict with
the TRIPs Agreement. The two regimes, the Convention on Bio-
logical Diversity9 and the United Nations' Food and Agriculture
Organization's "International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Re-
sources,"10 both recognize a less exclusively proprietary approach
to the ownership and use of biological resources.'1 In the coming
decades, such conflicts will most likely be resolved through
processes of geopolitical bargaining and growing civic participa-
tion in the construction of new international legal regimes.
I. How THE TRIPs AGREEMENT THREATENS THE PUBLIC
INTEREST
A. Overruling national sovereignty
The GATT-TRIPs rules prohibit member countries from dis-
criminating as to the "place of invention" or as to the "field of tech-
nology" when granting patents. 2 These criteria limit a member
country's future use of IPRs as tools for development. The Agree-
ment requires member governments to protect "plant varieties
either by patents or by an effective sui generis system or by any
combination thereof." 3 These provisions were so controversial
during the Uruguay Round negotiations that the final agreement
states that such provisions "be reviewed four years after the date
of entry into force."' 4 Although the TRIPs Agreement provides a
five to ten year grace period for countries in development,' 5 this
may not be sufficient time to enable the creation of proper domes-
tic development strategies.
For example, some countries have allowed patents on processes
but not products, 16 ensuring that domestic firms can develop prod-
ucts of social value, such as medicines and seeds through a process
9 Convention on Biological Diversity of the United Nations Conference on Environment
and Development, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818 [hereinafter Convention on Biodiversity].
10 Report of the Conference of the FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations, 22d Sess., P 285, U.N. Doc. C83/Rep (1983) (adopting International Undertaking
on Plant Genetic Resources).
11 See Kadidal, supra note 5, at 231-32 (explaining methods of ownership of biological
resources); Yano, supra note 2, at 446-47 (describing Convention on Biological Diversity as
agreement among several states to work towards preserving biological diversity).
12 See TRIPs, supra note 4, at art. 27(1).
13 Id. art. 27(3b).
14 Id. (indicating that such provisions are subject to review in year 1999).
15 Id. arts. 65, 66.
16 See Carolyn S. Corn, Note, Pharmaceutical Patents in Brazil: Is Compulsory Licensing
the Solution?, 9 B.U. IN'L L.J. 71, 77-78 (1991) (noting that many Latin American Coun-
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of reverse engineering. While these firms may not copy the formu-
las of patented products, they may create their own formulas
which produce identical results.'7 Many countries also use "com-
pulsory licensing" laws to ensure that companies do not withhold
useful products from the public.' 8
India, Argentina, and Brazil are examples of countries where
the "compulsory licensing" policies have resulted in an improve-
ment in public health. Thus, strong national opposition to the
TRIPs rules has emerged in these countries.19 Historically, India
has denied patents completely in the fields of pharmaceutical and
agricultural products, on grounds that these products are essen-
tial to public welfare.2" Recently, the Indian Parliament refused
to pass legislation to bring its national IPR laws into conformity
with TRIPs. 21 Argentina, on the other hand, has used its IPR
laws to develop a strong pharmaceutical sector which has contrib-
uted extensively to its national economy and, thus, has developed
as a powerful competitor in the global marketplace.2 2 Brazil is
seeking to mirror Argentina's success with its IPR laws.23 In both
Argentina and Brazil, their Congresses also have fought against
tries refuse granting patents for pharmaceutical products, although such countries usually
grant process patents for pharmaceuticals).
17 Id. at 77 n.50.
18 See id. at 88-89 nn. 158-60 (recognizing that Canada has had compulsory licensing of
patents since 1923); see also New Study Underscores Need for Maintaining Strong Intellec-
tual Property Protection Under GATT; Report Concludes that Proposed Special Exceptions
for Generic Drug Industry Would put U.S. Firms at Risk, Bus. WIE, Oct. 23, 1995 [herein-
after New Study] (noting that Thailand, India, and Singapore force innovator companies to
provide compulsory licenses for patented products to competitors if government deems that
result is in best interest of consumers).
19 See Corn, supra note 16, at 81-85 (explaining opposition to TRIPs); see also Alan Gut-
terman, International Intellectual Property: A Summary of Recent Developments and Issues
for the Coming Decade, 8 SANTA CLARA Comp. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 335, 343 (1992) (providing
Argentina, Brazil & India as examples of countries that have inadequate protection for
pharmaceutical).
20 See Gutterman, supra note 19, at 402 (discussing India's lack of patent protection for
food, medicine and drugs).
21 See Corn, supra note 16, at 81-82 (noting that Brazil also refused to pass legislation to
have laws conform with TRIPs); see also Sanjoy Hazarika, India Presses U.S. to Pass Biotic
Treaty, N.Y. TIzs, Apr. 23, 1995, at A13 (noting India's resistance to clause in GATT
relating to intellectual property rights).
22 See David Pilling, World Trade News:Argentines Spit Out Bitter Patents Pill. 'Pirates'
Charter' Versus 'Abusive Prices', FIN. Toms, June 14, 1995, at 8 (noting feeling of United
States companies that Argentina should be in higher category of development).
23 See Corn, supra note 16, at 77-78. Current laws in Brazil would prevent such patents
from being inadequately exploited by permitting the granting of a compulsory license to a
third party whenever the patented invention is not being exploited in order to meet the
demands of market. Id.
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altering the national IPR laws to conform with the TRIPs
Agreement.2 4
B. Patenting Plant Varieties
A patent enables a company or an inventor to monopolize the
market for new plant varieties for the term of the patent, gener-
ally a period of seventeen to twenty years. In developing new
products, the first step consists of removing plant samples from
the field and transporting them to the laboratory. Next, scientists
move a single gene from one spot to another within a cell. Irre-
spective of whether an actual variation results in the next genera-
tion, a "plant variety" is created which is deemed sufficiently
"new" to qualify as a patentable invention.25
While most genetic engineering experiments do not produce
worthwhile results, in a few cases, the variations have generated
"desirable" traits which are able to be reproduced and marketed.26
Monsanto, for example, expects to generate an additional $150
million annually by patenting and marketing just one of its new
products: a variety of soybean designed to withstand intensive ap-
plications of the herbicide "Round-Up," also marketed by
Monsanto. 27
Patent-holding companies will most likely use the GATT-TRIPs
rules to ensure that their monopoly rights are upheld. In the
United States, the Asgrow Seed Company, a subsidiary of the
Upjohn Company, sued two Iowa farmers, Denny and Becky
Winterboer, for harvesting and selling a variety of seed which had
sexually reproduced in their field.28 Initially, the district court
24 See Argentine Patent Measure Heads for Veto by Menem, J. COM., Apr. 12, 1995, at A3
(reporting President Carlos Menem of Argentina will veto offensive parts of patent law
regarding pharmaceutical); see also James Bruce, Vote on Patent Law Further Delayed in
Brazil, J. COM., Apr. 28, 1995, at A3 (reporting on another postponement in vote on Brazil-
ian patent law, preventing intellectual property protection). See generally Corn, supra note
16, at 80-85 (describing Brazil as global leader in opposition of patent protection).
25 See, e.g., Kadidal, supra note 5, at 239 (explaining invention process in pharmaceuti-
cal industry); see Edgar, supra note 2, at 84-86 nn.59-61 (citing United States cases with
different results, including Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948)
and Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156 (1852)).
26 See Edgar, supra note 2, at 87-92 (discussing controversial United States patent of
Indian tree).
27 See Marcy Burstiner, A Seedy Business, MuLTmAT'L MONITOR, Mar. 1988.
28 Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 115 S. Ct. 788, 791 (1995); see Neil Hamilton, Who
Owns Dinner: Evolving Legal Mechanisms for Ownership of Plant Genetic Resources, 28
TuLsA L.J. 587, 632-41 (1993) (discussing Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer).
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granted summary judgment for the seed company.2 9 That decision
was reversed by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.30
Asgrow then appealed to the United States Supreme Court which,
in January, 1995, issued an 8-1 ruling against the farmers.31 Jus-
tice Stevens, the only dissenter, agreed with the earlier Court of
Appeals ruling which allowed farmers to sell up to half of their
crops for seed, even if the seeds were legally protected.3 2
Competition to dominate the vast field of genetically engineered
plant varieties has led to claims for "sweeping patents."33 For ex-
ample, Agracetus, a subsidiary of W.R. Grace, has sought exclu-
sive rights to all genetically engineered varieties of cotton and soy-
beans.34 The patents originally were granted by the United States
Patents and Trademarks Office (PTO) in 199211 and by the Euro-
pean Patent Convention in 1994.36 Since then, however, the PTO
has tentatively reversed the sweeping cotton patent after a chal-
lenge by the United States Department of Agriculture and an
anonymous party.37 The European patent also has been chal-
lenged on grounds that genetically engineered plants are neither
29 Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 795 F. Supp. 915, 916, 920 (N.D. Iowa 1991) (holding
defendant farmers will not be permitted to continue selling seed using brown bag method),
rev'd, 982 F.2d 486 (Fed. Cir. 1992), affd, 115 S. Ct. 788 (1995).
30 Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 982 F.2d 486, 492 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (finding no crop
limitation on amount of seed saved by former), aftd, 115 S. Ct. 788 (1995). See BriefAmici
Curiae of Rural Advancement Foundation International, Friends of the Earth, Seed Savers
Exchange, et. al., October 1994 (asserting that Federal Circuit was correct not to limiting
farmer's rights to sell seeds to other farmers).
31 Winterboer, 115 S. Ct. at 795. The Court stated, "[w]e hold that a farmer... may sell
for reproductive purposes only such seed as he has saved for the purpose or replanting his
own acreage." Id. at 796.
32 Id. at 797 (Stevens, J., Dissenting) (noting owner of personal property, even if pat-
ented, is free to dispose of property); see also Winterboer, 982 F.2d at 491-92 (noting § 2543
does not limit amount of seed farmer can save or sell).
33 See Edgar, supra note 2, at 77-78 (discussing effect of genetically engineered plants on
patent system); Steve Lustgarden, Patently out of Control: Biotechnology, VEGETARIAN
TnMEs, Dec. 1, 1994; Rogers Worthington, Love Polyester? Here's a Crop You Can Cotton To,
CHI. TRmuNE, Dec. 19, 1994.
34 See Neil D. Hamilton, Why Own the Farm if You Can Own the Farmer (and the Crop)?:
Contract Production and Intellectual Property Protection of Grain Crops, 73 NEB. L. Rv.
48, 91 (1994) (describing Agracetus' attempt to obtain exclusive rights to certain geneti-
cally engineered plants); Lustgarden, supra note 33; Worthington, supra note 33.
35 See Edgar, supra note 2, at 87-88 (discussing controversial U.S. patent for natural
pesticide owned by W.R. Grace in India); "Species"Patent on Transgenic Soybeans Granted
to Transnational Chemical Giant W.R. Grace [hereinafter "Species" Patent], RAFi CommeuNI-
QUE, Mar./Apr. 1994, at 2 available at <http://www.charm.net/Arafl/19942.ntm/>.
36 See "Species" Patent, supra note 35 at 1.
37 See Lustgarden, supra note 33; Worthington, supra note 33.
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"novel" inventions nor "non-obvious" innovations, according to the
criteria of European patent law.3
C. Hindering Third World Development
In addition to threatening national sovereignty and the monopo-
lization of plants and seeds, the GATT-TRIPs Agreement will hin-
der the Third World from attaining self-sufficiency in pharmaceu-
tical production. Third World drug manufacturers will be
discouraged from entering production, or be forced out of business
altogether by pharmaceutical transnational corporations
("TNCs"). As legal protection has shifted in favor of TNCs, the
importance of local production and development of home-based ex-
pertise and capital has been ignored. In order to debate candidly
the desirability of international patent protection, both sides must
acknowledge that intellectual property pirating fuels develop-
ment.39 The TRIPs agreement, however, merely seeks to broaden
the scope of anti-piracy enforcement, thus strengthening the po-
tent powers granted to TNCs in the Uruguay Round by shifting
the burden of proof in patent disputes on Third World manufac-
turers. Certain articles in the TRIPs Agreement, such as Article
34,40 place Third World firms at great risk and disadvantage when
faced with patent suits by well-financed TNCs because they do not
have the resources to defend themselves. 41 The accused manufac-
38 See Edgar, supra note 2, at 79-80 (discussing novelty requirement to ensure not grant-
ing monopoly to non-original inventor). See generally Michael J. Huft, Comment, Indige-
nous Peoples and Drug Discovery Research: A Question of Intellectual Property Rights, 89
Nw. U. L. REV. 1678, 1687 (1995) (discussing Wester firms ability to develop genetic re-
sources dependant on intellectual property issues).
39 See Stephan Kirchanski, Protection of U.S. Patents in Developing Countries: U.S. Ef-
forts to Enforce Pharmaceutical Patents in Thailand, 16 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 569,
577 (1994) (suggesting that equation is two sided-stimulation of local "private economy
and erroneous losses to developed nations"); cf Edgar, supra note 2, at 92-93 n.133 (stating
that "[h]istory shows that strong patent protection is the best way to encourage innovations
and hold costs down"); Reichman, supra note 2, at 175 (suggesting that intellectual prop-
erty pirating opens markets to "second comers who provide cheaper and better products
through imitation and incremental innovation").
40 See TRIPs, supra note 4, art. 34(1). Article 34 states "if the subject matter of a patent
is a process for obtaining a product, the judicial authorities shall have the authority to
order the defendant to prove that the process to obtain an identical product is different
from the patented process." Id.
41 Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR), Statement as to How the
Uruguay Round Series: The Interests of United States Commerce, 1994 WL 761806
(G.A.T.T.), Sept. 27, 1994 (stating that TRIPs Agreement does more to protect and enforce
rights of creators of intellectual property, using as example assurance that TRIPs agree-
ment gives 20 year patent in pharmaceutical).
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turer must demonstrate that it has not violated process patents
held by TNC's.
The TRIPs Agreement provides patent protection for twenty
years beginning on the date of filing, and subsequently allows an
additional twenty years of patent protection to the manufacturing
process if that process is new.42 Once a product patent has ex-
pired, other manufacturers are free to manufacture that prod-
uct.43 If the manufacturing process is still under protection how-
ever, the new entrant needs to develop an alternative production
process.44 The burden of proof is on the secondary manufacturer to
demonstrate that its new process is in fact unique.45 Due to this
heavy burden and the fear of legal action, small firms may not be
willing to enter the market.46 Without competition, present mo-
nopolies represented by TNCs, will become more powerful in the
Third World pharmaceutical trade.47 This lack of competition will
increase prices and lower customer service.48 In order for Article
34 to be fair, the burden of proof should rest on the well-financed
accuser and not the accused Third World manufacturer.
The present system of imposing the burden of proof on the ac-
cused will severely limit the capacity of the indigenous pharma-
ceutical industry to compete with TNCs. Since the pharmaceuti-
cal industry requires huge capital investments and expensive
42 See TRIPs, supra note 4, art. 33; see also 35 U.S.C. § 154(c) (1994) (indicating that
United States implemented patents in accordance with terms of GATT).
43 See Richard Deluce & Jeffrey Butler, GATT Creates Conflict Over Patent Terms,
N.J.L.J., July 24, 1995, at Intell. Prop. L. Supp. (discussing effects of extended patent pro-
tection on generic drug industry under U.S. legislation which complies with the patent
requirements of the Uruguay Rounds); The New America Generics Watson Pharmaceutical
Avoids Sticky New Drug Patent Rules Gloria Lau Business is hopping at Watson Pharma-
ceutical, a generic-drug company in Corona, Calif., INVESTOR's Bus. DAILY, June 2, 1995, at
A5 (stating that prescription drug industry represents $60 billion market in United
States).
44 See generally Huft, supra note 38, at 1706-20 (discussing joint inventionship and pos-
sible bars to patentability).
45 See id. at 1718-25 (discussing publication as bar to patentability and invalidating po-
tential patents not meeting "novelty" requirement of patents).
46 See Julie Shiver, Rap Music to Medical Formulas. Little Seems Safe From Duplica-
tion, LA. Tdnvs, Apr. 11, 1994, at Al (observing that in 1988, Brazilian pirating of patents
resulted in United States imposing massive tariffs amounting to $30 million on Brazilian
pharmaceutical imports).
47 See Jenifer Sachs, Wall Street Financing Health Care Resolution, INVESTMENT DEAL-
ERS' DIG., Oct. 3, 1994, at 14 (indicating that United States pharmaceutical industry is $60
billion industry).
48 See Roberto Gerry, An Asian-Pacific Prescription, CHEmIcAL MARKETING REP., May 22,
1995, at SR8 (specifically breaking down market numbers).
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product promotions, indigenous industries are unable to compete
and create a market share for themselves.4 s
The Third World already has paid a great price to comply with
United States patent protections. The following problems need to
be addressed:
1. Non-use of a patent.
In many cases, TNCs will apply for a patent in a particular
country, but will not actually set up manufacturing facilities in
the host country. This results in the drug, but not the production
process, being imported to that country. Such non-use practice re-
flects a North/South imbalance apparent in the fact that over
eighty percent of Third World patents in Third World countries
are owned by foreigners, mainly TNCs. Furthermore, over ninety-
five percent of these foreign-held patents are not utilized in these
countries. 50  This kind of patent protection blocks local
competition.
Imported patented products are generally more expensive and
negatively impact the trade balance in a developing country.5 ' Ar-
ticle 27 of the TRIPs agreement, which mandates equal patent
protection for imported and locally manufactured products, will
further exacerbate this imbalance. 52 Consequently, the world com-
munity should reevaluate Article 27 and encourage local produc-
tion to improve the balance of trade of Third World countries. Lo-
49 See First Bite for BASF, BASFAG, MFG. CHEMIST, Dec. 1994, at 3 (noting pharmaceu-
tical companies that lack dollars for research and development to compete in global mar-
ket); see also Douglas Olsen, To be Competitive Follow These Four Steps, REED PUB. U.SA.
RES. & DEV., Feb. 1994, at 25 (noting that United States industry is facing intense, global
competition); Drugs, WEI Panelists Debate Effects of Cost Containment on Drug Innovation,
Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA), at A144 (July 29, 1994) (stating that returns for pharma-
ceutical is skewed with only one-third earning return above and beyond research and de-
velopment costs, while return of majority of new drugs does not even carry costs); New
Study, supra note 18 (indicating that United States pharmaceutical industry members in-
vest on average 15 years and $359 million to bring medicine to market, and total pharma-
ceutical research and development investment in 1994 topped $13 billion, rating higher
than any other United States industry).
50 See CHAKARARAVARTm RAGHAVAN, RECOLONIZATION: GATT, THE URUGUAY RouND &
THE THmD WoRLD 123 (1990).
51 See Pablo M. Challu, The Consequences of Pharmaceutical Product Patenting, WoRLD
COMPETrrIoN, Dec. 1991, at 107.
52 TRIPs, supra note 4, art. 27(1). The language of the article states that, ... patent
shall be available and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination... whether products
are imported or locally produced." Id. See generally Owen T. Adikibi, The Multinational
Corporation and Monopoly of Patents in Nigeria, 16 WoRLD DEv. 511, 511-26 (1988) (exam-
ining effect of foreign monopoly of patent grants in Nigeria and implications for technology
development in that country).
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cal production would also facilitate the transfer of technology-
the basic premise for awarding patent protection-and would pro-
vide an economic boost for third world economies.
2. Licensing and Process Agreements.
When TNCs license their production processes to Third World
manufacturers, they often prohibit their licensees from exporting
products. Such export limitation agreements are not considered
"barriers to trade" under GATT, although they do serve to restrict
access to many markets. Moreover, efficient Third World manu-
facturers who improve products through creative innovation will
never realize the profits of their labor. These producers usually
are required to grant all patent rights back to the parent company
to assure that the legal benefits remain with the First World cor-
porate owners.53 Further, many process agreements ban the es-
tablishment of research and development facilities by the licensee,
charge excessive royalties, or force the Third World firm to
purchase inputs from the patent holder. Thus, these agreements
hinder the development of indigenous industries, and transfer
wealth out of Third World countries.54
3. Transfer Pricing.
In order to maximize further profits and to avoid paying taxes to
Third World governments, pharmaceutical TNCs will sell prod-
ucts, patented and otherwise, to their subsidiaries at prices that
are anywhere from 87% to 2900% higher than those found in open
markets. 55 This allows subsidiaries to show a net loss on their ac-
counts and evade taxes in host countries. At the same time, sub-
sidiaries will purchase ingredients, such as sugar, from their par-
ent company at excessive prices. This price manipulation has a
negative impact on the balance of trade, increasing the trade defi-
cit of developing Third World countries. Every patent creates a
53 See generally Adikibi, supra note 52, at 511-26 (discussing effect of foreign monopoly
of patent grants in certain countries).
54 See generally Arman S. Kirim, Reconsidering Patents and Economic Development, 13
WORLD DEV. 13, 219-36 (1985) (discussing effect of patents in Third World economic
development).
55 See generally GARY GEREFmI, THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY AND DEPENDENCY IN THE
THnD WORLD 193-98 (1983) (showing relative wholesale prices for various drugs in differ-
ent countries based upon national law and policy, as indicators of state's capacity to influ-
ence economic development).
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twenty-year monopoly. Abolishing patents' monopoly power
would free indigenous firms to purchase products from open mar-
kets and relieve the pressures of price manipulation.
Without the patent protection of the TRIPs agreement, TNCs
would be more willing to set up equitable joint ventures with in-
digenous firms. TNCs would gain access to new markets and local
companies would receive more sophisticated technologies and
products which might not otherwise be available.
4. Biotechnological Substitution.
Lastly, the GATT-TRIPs Agreement not only shields TNCs from
competition by lower cost local industries but also turns the tables
by helping biotechnology companies compete in the world market-
place against agricultural exports vital to many national econo-
mies. Biologically engineered synthetic substitutes for sugar, co-
coa, and plant oils are already taking over large segments of the
global markets for these commodities, upon which many impover-
ished African and Latin American nations depend.5"
D. Harming health
GATT-TRIPs provisions also will permit pharmaceutical TNCs
to create monopolies resulting in extremely high prices of
medicines in Third World countries. Low-income consumers will
be have to pay higher prices for essential medicines. Many life-
saving medicines will simply be unavailable due to the problem of
non-use of patents previously described in this Article.57
56 See Achim Seiler, Biotechnology and Third World Countries: Economic Interests, Tech-
nical Options and Socio-Economic Impact, PUGWASH MEETING No. 208, July 23-29 1995, at
5 (noting that cell culture methods, enzyme techniques, genetic engineering, and other new
technological research is aimed at developing bio-synthetic plant compounds for both food
and non-food integrated industrial production systems as substitutes for agricultural ex-
ports important to developing countries' employment and balance of trade).
57 See TRIPs, supra note 4, art. 31 (a)-(b). In theory, article 31 of the TRIPs agreement
allows a nation to deal with a worst case scenario of non-use: that a patent holder will not
produce enough of a vital drug. Id. Article 31 allows for other use of the subject matter of a
patent without the authorization of the right holder provided that such use may only be
permitted if, prior to such use, the proposed user has made efforts to obtain authorization
from the right holder. Id. This requirement may be waived by a member in the case of a
national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency. Id. However, the qualifica-
tion that the right holder shall be paid adequate renumeration in the circumstances of each
case, taking into account the economic value of the authorization, means that nations may
have the will and the means, but not the funds to break a medical patent. Id. In addition,
they cannot use article 31 to derogate from a patent they find untenable due to the high
price of the patented product. Id. art. 31 (h).
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Argentina is a powerful example of price impact. Nearly all
pharmaceuticals marketed by Argentinean drug firms now are
sold at prices ranging from fifteen to eighty percent lower than
global corporation prices.58 Compared to fifteen years ago, the Ar-
gentinean industry has made tremendous progress. 59 Through lo-
cal market loyalty and efficient production, Argentinean firms
now can provide low cost pharmaceuticals to the public. In addi-
tion, Argentina has developed a small export market for
pharmaceuticals. The Argentinean pharmaceutical industry had
created a strong presence by locally producing and marketing
drugs to the public at prices much lower than those of the TNCs.
Argentinean producers were able to accomplish this feat by defy-
ing and ignoring international patent systems created and pro-
moted by European nations and the United States.6 0 This has al-
lowed Argentineans to compete with transnational
pharmaceutical firms, thus forcing the transnational corporations
to provide their products at competitive prices. The following are
some price differentials in pharmaceutical products between the
Argentinean and US markets:
58 See Challu, supra note 51, at 107; see also Calum Simms, Argentine President Vetoes
Patent Measure, N.Y. TIsMS, Apr. 19, 1995, at A5 (discussing loss of $300 million per year
from sale of pharmaceutical in Argentina by United States pharmaceutical industry).
59 See Daniel Chudnovsky, The Challenge by Domestic Enterprises to the Transnational
Corporations Domination: A Case Study of the Argentine Pharmaceutical Industry, 7
WoRLD DEV. 45, 45-58 (1979) (noting that, given decrease in innovation of large transna-
tional corporations operating in pharmaceutical field, domestic firms have been able to
challenge domination of pharmaceutical industry by foreign enterprises).
60 See Kirchanski, supra, note 39, at 580 n.69. There is empirical evidence which sup-
ports the correlation between the internal level of creation of patentable inventions and the
level of development in a country and the degree to which a country respects or violates
intellectual property rights. Id. at 597. The economic development of an extremely under-
developed country is indifferent to intellectual property protection. Id. at 605-06. More ad-
vanced countries become the greatest pirates of intellectual property because they can
profit from the intellectual property but are not yet in a position to benefit from the protec-
tion of intellectual property. Id. at 596-97. Contra GAIT Uruguay Round Trade Agree-
ments: Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Ways & Means Comm., 103d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1994) (statement of Gerald J. Mossinghoff, President, Pharmaceutical Manuf. Ass'n).
Mossinghoff asserts that piracy by developing countries costs international pharmaceutical
industry as much as $5 billion annually. Id.; Ruth L. Gana, U.S. Science Policy and the
International Transfer of Technology, 3 J. TRANSNATVL & POL'Y. 205, 235 (1994). Gana notes
that the traditional Western position is that the Third World benefits from infringing
United States' intellectual property. Id.
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Active Ingredient US Market (US$) Argentinean Market (US$)
Brand Name Foreign or Licenses Domestic Producers
Ciprofloxacin 106.82 14.20 13.15
Ketoconazole 240.05 36.10 26.65
Ranitidine 84.23 21.95 11.7661
India has had a similar experience. Using its compulsory li-
censing clause, India allowed the development of a national phar-
maceutical industry.6 2 The indigenous industry has proved capa-
ble of producing many essential drugs for its people at affordable
prices. 3 Such successful practice, however, would no longer be
possible under the Uruguay Round. 4 In fact, the independence of
the Indian pharmaceutical industry already has been seriously
undermined through unilateral trade measures taken by the
United States, largely provoked by the intervention of the United
States pharmaceutical industry.65 As a result of these trade meas-
ures, India has changed its patent laws to conform with most
United States demands.66 Consequently, Indian manufacturers
61 See Challu, supra note 51, at 107.
62 See Rhonda Bershok, Releasing the Tiger? India Moves Into the Global Market, 4 INT'L
LEGAL PERssp. 53, 92-94 (1992) (detailing India's compulsory licensing and rationale); see
also Alan S. Gutterman, The North-South Debate Regarding the Protection of Intellectual
Property Rights, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 89, 127, 134 n.193, 139 n.315 (1993) (discussing
compulsory licenses and inadequacies found in India's provisions); J. Herbert O'Toole, Pat-
ent Systems in Less Developed Countries: The Cases of India and the Andean Pact Coun-
tries, 2 J.L. & TECH. 229, 232-33 (1987) (describing India's compulsory licenses).
63 See Gutterman, supra note 62, at 126 (noting government intervention in pharmaceu-
tical marketing designed to lower cost in developing countries).
64 See Louis A. Schapiro, The Role of Intellectual Property Protection and International
Competitiveness, 58 ANTrrRusT L.J. 569, 576 (1989) (noting India's support of compulsory
licensing); see also Implications of Uruguay Round Patent Moves, MARKETLETrER
(Marketletter Pub. Ltd.), May 30, 1994 (outlining compulsory licensing provisions and
prohibitions of Uruguay Round).
65 See Omnibus Trade & Competition Act of 1988, 7 U.S.C. § 1691 (1988) [hereinafter
Omnibus Trade Act]. The Omnibus Trade Act's Super 301 provision, actually § 310 of Om-
nibus Trade Act, allows the United States Trade Representative to undertake trade inves-
tigations and identify nations that enact trade practices against the United States which
are "unreasonable" or "unjustifiable." 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1988). The identified countries are
obliged to alter those practices or suffer a loss of trade with the United States. Id.
66 See Hazarika, supra note 21, at A13 ("India finally agreed to fall into line with Ameri-
can policy on the issue after opening its economy to foreign investment."); see also India to
Accept Drug Patents, 8 J. PROPRIETARY RTs. 33 (1993) (discussing India's conformity with
United States intellectual property laws); Rao in a Bind: India, ECONOMIST, Apr. 1, 1995,
at 30 (discussing internal governmental tension concerning GATT plant patent provisions);
Sandy Tolan, Against the Grain Multinational Corporations Peddling Patented Seeds and
Chemical Pesticides are Poised to Revolutionize India's Ancient Agricultural System, L.A.
TndEs, July 10, 1994, at 18 (reporting ramifications of India's conformity with GATT patent
provisions). But see Trade-India: Government Gets Cold Feet on Patents Bill, INT'L PRESS
SERVICE, Nov. 28, 1995 (suggesting potential delay in voting to conform India's patent laws
with GATr requirements).
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will no longer be able to provide affordable drugs to Indian
consumers.
Compare the result of domestic patent laws through a price
comparison between products available in the Indian and Pakis-
tani markets:
India Pakistan US
Drug (Indian Rs.) (Indian Rs.) (Indian Rs.)
Ciprofloxacin 51.00 234.63 305.21
Ketoconazole 43.00 221.96 673.67
Ranitidine 29.30 260.40 744.6567
In short, it is obvious that patents, in general, benefit the TNCs
and stifle the growth of industry and health in Third World coun-
tries. This is particularly true in the pharmaceutical industry,
where access to vital drugs is limited.
II. ALTERNATIVE REGIMES
A. Convention on Biological Diversity
In June 1992, more than 150 countries, with the United States
as a notable exception, signed the United Nations Convention on
Biological Diversity.68 The Convention stated their commitment to
"the conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable use of its
components and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits aris-
ing out of the utilization of genetic resources." These goals are to
be achieved by ensuring "appropriate access to genetic resources
and by appropriate transfer of relevant technologies, taking into
account all rights over those resources and to technologies, and by
appropriate funding."69 The Convention's emphasis on IPRs has
67 See B.K. Keayla & Biswajitt Dhar, Indian Pharmaceutical Industry and Patent
Regime for Drug Security, in PATENT REGIME AND TRIPs, NATIONAL WORKING GROUP ON
PATENT LAWs, Sept. 1993, at 14-16 (contrasting price differential for drugs available in
Indian and Pakistani markets). But see USTR Announcement on Foreign Government
Procurement and Intellectual Property Protection, 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 18, at 791
(May 3, 1995) (stating administration's determination to ensure adequate and effective
productive of intellectual property rights and fair and equitable market access for U.S.
products).
68 The Convention on Biological Diversity, 1994: Hearings on Treaty Doc. 103-20, Before
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1994) (statement of
Sen. Mitchell) (expressing disappointment at U.S. failure to enter environmental treaty).
69 Id. at 2, art. 1.
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been placed in perspective, namely by ensuring "that such rights
are supportive of and do not run counter to its objectives."70
The Clinton Administration met with biotechnology industry
representatives 71 before signing the Convention in June 1994. At
that time, the Administration published an Interpretive State-
ment 72 which redefined the IPR provisions of the Convention.73 In
redefining the IPRs, the United States appears to demand that
IPR protection under the Convention on Biological Diversity be
consistent with the GATT.
The real world relationship between biodiversity and IPRs has
resulted in a new "gold rush" known as bioprospecting. Seeking
new plants to use for the creation of new products, ethnobotanists
travel to indigenous communities, sometimes offering compensa-
tion in the form of gifts or shares in future royalties earned once a
product is patented and marketed. Driven by possible future
riches, these explorers inadvertently disrupt the indigenous com-
munities.74 Once disrupted, it may be difficult or impossible for
that human community to restore the traditional balance between
itself and the ecosystem. In 1994, FAO Assistant Director-Gen-
70 Id. at 39, art. 16(5) (summarizing article 16 of Convention which provides that partici-
pating countries are obligated to ensure swift access to new technologies relevant to conser-
vation of biological diversity).
71 Id. at 36 (statement of Lisa Conte, Shaman Pharmaceutical) (stating that Shaman
Pharmaceutical Company is not bank and that it could be as long as ten years before firm
can reap rewards of new drug).
72 See Administrative Statement from the President of the United States transmitting the
Convention on Biological Diversity, 103rd Congress, 1st Sess., Treaty Doc. 103-20, USGPO
(1993). The President announced that the United States will sign Convention on Biological
Diversity. Id.
73 Id. The President declared United States patent law provisions an adequate and effec-
tive protection of IPRs; the United States will not recognize patent laws which restrict
patenting nor allow compulsory licensing arrangements. Id. The President also warned
that the United States will "strongly resist any actions taken by Parties to the Convention
that lead to inadequate levels of protection of intellectual property rights, and will continue
to pursue a vigorous policy with respect to the adequate and effective protection of intellec-
tual property rights in negotiations on bilateral and multilateral trade agreements." Id.;
see Eduardo Lachica, GATT Negotiations Near Well-Balanced Accord on Intellectual Prop-
erty, AsLAN WALL ST. J., Oct. 18, 1993, at 11. "The American pharmaceutical industry...
wants to shorten the transition periods to be granted to developing countries. Under the
current draft .... [even] the poorest [countries]... would have a grace period of 10 years."
Id.
74 See Edwin J. Smith, Book Review, Extinction: The Causes and Consequences of the
Disappearance of Species, 55 S. CAL. L. REv. 769, 769-70 (1982) (critiquing book discussing
species conservation); see also William Stevens, Talks Seek to Prevent Huge Loss of Species,
N.Y. TmbEs, Mar. 3, 1992, at C4 (suggesting nations should be required to protect habitats,
ecosystems, and endangered species).
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eral Obaidullah Khana referred to such bioprospecting as
"biopiracy."75
The emphasis on finding and isolating plants with the most
marketable traits has lead to the decline of other plant species,
since only new techno-varieties are being cultivated. In the
United States alone, a survey of seed banks 76 showed that some
varieties of non-commercial crops such as chufas, martynia, and
rampion have been lost entirely.77
The privatization of patented genetic resources accelerates the
trend toward monocultural cropping. In India, for example, peas-
ant producers now cultivate some 50,000 varieties of rice, which
have developed through traditional farming practices over the
millennia.78 Such astonishing variety arose from subtle differ-
ences in the soil and in the climatic conditions, occurring due to
mutation, evolution, and the deliberate application of cultural
preferences. 79 The GATT-TRIPs rules, however, would prohibit
these farmers from harvesting and reusing the seed of any rice
variety which has been patented.80 Also, lack of access to seed
stocks will cause the abandonment of India's biologically diverse
agriculture, necessary to sustain healthy diversity in surrounding
ecosystems.
A further possible problem is that an engineered organism may
produce unanticipated harmful impacts on other species. For ex-
ample, scientists at Oregon State University have engineered a
variety of bacteria known to reside in the soil and contribute to
75 See FAO Official Blasts Western 'BioPiracy', REUTERS WORLD SERV., June 6, 1994.
Various suggestions have been made as to what contractual and legislative safeguards may
prevent such exploitation, and even turn bioprospecting into a source of needed resources
on the national and local levels. Id.
76 See generally Suzanne Possehl, Its Budget Slashed, Russian Seed Bank Fights for Its
Life, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 23, 1993, at C4 (illustrating grave result when countries loose seed
banks).
77 See generally CARY FOWLER AND PAT MOONEY, SHArERiNG: FOOD, POLITICS AND THE
Loss OF GENETIC DIVERsrry 54-90 (1990) (describing development of crop diversity through
thousands of years of traditional agriculture).
78 See generally id. at 54-90 (1990). The authors describe the development of crop diver-
sity through thousands of years of traditional agriculture. Id. The authors also explain the
threats that the seed industry and genetic engineering pose to this diversity. Id.
79 See generally Steven Lohr, New Varieties of Hardy Rice Hold Promise, N.Y. TIMEs,
Aug. 14, 1984, at C1 (discussing process of developing varieties of rice and benefits derived
from production).
80 See Hamilton, supra note 28, at 657 n.222 (citing United States Department of Agri-
culture report by R.D. Plowman, Administrator of Agricultural Research Service, discuss-
ing 140 important rice occasions showing all ancestry traces to 22 introductions in south-
ern rice belt and 23 in western rice belt).
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the decomposing of plant material. This enables the soil to effi-
ciently convert agricultural wastes to ethanol fuel.8 ' Although the
project was successful in meeting this goal, in the late stages of
testing the scientists discovered that the new product also de-
stroyed much of a beneficial fungus essential to the recycling of
nitrogen through plant roots. This result could lead to decertifica-
tion throughout the range of the product.8 2
B. Food and Agriculture Organization's International
Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources
During the 1970s and 1980s, developing nations expressed con-
cern about the free flow of plant genetic resource materials, or
germplasm, from the South to the North.8" The question was
posed: why are patented seeds of southern origin bringing in tre-
mendous profits to multinational seed companies without compen-
sation for the developing world?8 4 In the culmination of the "Seed
Wars" of the 1980s,8 5 Third World leaders managed to express
their concerns in an international arena via the United Nations
Food and Agriculture Organization ("FAO"). In 1983, the FAO es-
tablished the Global System for the Conservation and Utilization
of Plant Genetic Resources. 6 This organization includes a legally
non-binding set of guidelines called the "International Undertak-
ing on Plant Genetic Resources" ("Undertaking")8 7 and an inter-
81 See Biotech Backfire, SEATTLE TIMEs, Aug. 16, 1994, at A6 (discussing unexpected re-
sults of Oregon research); see also Robert C. Cowen, When it Comes to Soil and Genetic
Engineering, Proceed with Caution, CHRISTIAN SCL MoNrrOR, Aug. 31, 1994, at 13 (describ-
ing Oregon State University research); Richard Hill, Putting the Earth Back in Earth Day,
PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Apr. 20, 1995, at D1 (detailing Oregon State University botanical
study).
82 See William H. Schlesinger et al., Biological Feedbacks in Global Desertifrication, Sci-
ENCE, Mar. 2, 1990, at 1043 (discussing causes of desertifrication).
83 See Hope Shand, There is a Conflict Between Intellectual Property Rights and Rights of
Farmers in Developing Countries, 4 J. AGRIc. & ENVTL. ETHICS 131, 133 (1991); see also
Janet McDonald, Greening the GATT: Trade, Environment and the Future, 23 ENVTL. L.
397, 408-09 (1993) (discussing conflicting goals of North and South).
84 See Hamilton, supra note 28 (discussing Agrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer case). See gen-
erally June Start & Kenneth C. Hardy, Note, Not by Seeds Alone: The Biodiversity Treaty
and the Role for Native Agriculture, 12 STAN. ENVTL L.J. 85, 87-89 (1993) (discussing evolu-
tion of genetic diversity and natural diversity centers).
85 See Hamilton, supra note 28, at 600-05 (discussing seed wars and FAO Undertaking).
86 See generally J.W. MAvRrrs LA RIvIERE, TiE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL OF
SCIENTIFIC UNIONS IN BIODivERsrry AND GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH, IN BIOD1VERSrrY AND
GLOBAL CHANGE 4 (O.T. Solbrig et al. eds., 1995) (defining study of global system as under-
standing how earth system works, affect of past and present change, and study of mecha-
nisms which alter earth).
87 See Report of the Conference of the FAO, supra note 10, Agenda Item 6, at P 385. See
generally Harold J. Bordwin, The Legal and Political Implications of the International Un-
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governmental Commission on Plant Genetic Resources. The Com-
mission was created to monitor the implementation of the
Undertaking and more generally, to discuss the use, control, and
conservation of plant genetic resources. Each country possesses
one vote.
The purpose of the Undertaking is to "ensure that plant genetic
resources of economic or social interest, particularly for agricul-
ture, will be explored, preserved, evaluated, and made available
for plant breeding and for scientific purposes.""' The underlying
notion is based upon the common heritage principle, namely that
"plant genetic resources are a heritage of mankind and conse-
quently should be available without restriction." 9 This principle
is extended to include not only native plant materials, but also
farmer-developed varieties and new products of biotechnology. 90
The guarantee of access without restriction has caused eight in-
dustrialized countries to register reservations; the United States
and Canada still do not adhere to the Undertaking.
Two annexes to the Undertaking were adopted in 1989, and a
third was adopted in 1991. A fourth annex presently is being ne-
gotiated. One annex addressing Farmers' Rights recognizes the
right of farmers to be compensated for developing and conserving
plant genetic resources.91 For instance, it is well known that over
generations, Andean 92 potato farmers developed frost-resistant
dertaking on Plant Genetic Resources, 12 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1053, 1062-63 (1985) (discussing
developments of Undertaking).88 See Report of the Conference of the FAO, supra note 10, para. 385. The FAO's new
interpretation of the Undertaking provides that the objective of the agreed interpretation is
to achieve greater acceptance of the Undertaking and to strengthen the conservation, use,
and availability of germplasm. Id. Such efforts will be accomplished by recognizing and
legitimizing the rights to be compensated of germplasm donors and donors of funds and
technology through the parallel recognition of plant breeders' rights and farmers' rights.
Id. The FAO is using the agreed interpretation to lay the base for an equitable and solid
global system. Id.
89 Id. art. 1, para. 385.
90 Id. art. 2. para. 385; see Hamilton, supra note 28, at 601 (stating that Undertaking
was left open to apply to all genetic stocks including "special generic stocks" which include
specially bred proprietary lines of seed breeders).91 Interpretation of the International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources, Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 25th Sess., U.N. Doc. C/89/24 (Nov. 11-30,
1989) [hereinafter Interpretation of International Undertaking]. The Conference recognizes
certain farmers' rights, such as that plant genetic resources are a common heritage of man-
kind to be preserved and to be freely available for use. Id. Also, plant genetic resources are
indispensable for the genetic improvement of cultivated plants and are in danger of erosion
and loss, and there is a need to continue the conservation, development, and use of the
plant genetic resources in all countries. Id.
92 See Margaret A. Boulware, An Overview of Intellectual Property, 16 Hous. J. INr'L L.
441, 499 (1994) (stating that Andrean group consists of Bolivia, Columbia, Ecuador, Peru,
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varieties for growing in flat bottomlands where frost is common,
and that Chiapan 93 farmers have bred at least a dozen varieties of
corn which were heavily utilized by local farmers. Farmers'
Rights have emerged in part as a mechanism for equitably shar-
ing the benefits of utilizing plant genetic resources acquired by
seed breeders in the North with the people from whom the re-
sources were obtained.94 Likewise, the rights of local communities
have been acknowledged and are a major focus in the Convention
on Biological Diversity, which emerged during the 1992 Earth
Summit in Rio de Janeiro, extended to include indigenous commu-
nities.95 Despite such recognition in the Biodiversity Convention,
the definition and implementation of Farmers' Rights is still a
source of tension surrounding the use and control of plant genetic
resources.
96
The Plant Breeders' Rights annex acknowledges the significant
contributions of plant breeders, including those who work for pri-
vate entities such as Pioneer Hi-Bred and Northrup King, and
their work in international agricultural research. Plant breeders
were concerned that Farmers' Rights could represent a wholesale
transfer of wealth from the North to the South.97 This annex ac-
knowledges that the rights of plant breeders are not incompatible
and Venezuela); Environmental Events in Latin America, 1995,6 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL L. &
PoL'Y 367, 370-71 (1995) (discussing Andean Pact which seeks to establish joint position on
region's genetic resources and biodiversity in order to limit TNC access to local biological
resources).
93 Chiapas is a state in southern Mexico.
94 See Hamilton, supra note 28, at 601. "The concept of farmers' rights was developed as
a counterbalance to breeders' rights, and preservation of plant genetic resources by the
indigenous farmers of a country of origin." Id.
95 Convention on Biodiversity, supra note 9, art. 8, para. j. The Biodiversity Convention
states that contracting parties will "... . respect, preserve and maintain knowledge, innova-
tions and practices of indigenous and local communities embodying traditional lifestyles
relevant for the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity and promote their
wider application with the approval and involvement of the holders of such knowledge,
innovations and practices and encourage the equitable sharing of the benefits arising from
the utilization of such knowledge, innovations and practices. . . ." Id.
96 See Neil D. Hamilton, Why Own the Farm If You Can Own the Farmer (and the
Crop)?: Contract Production and Intellectual Property Protection of Grain Crops, 73 NEB. L.
REv. 48, 102 (1994). The United States refused to sign the Biodiversity treaty, for unlike
TRIPs, it failed to provide for plant patents or "breeders' rights." Id.
97 See James Odek, Bio-Piracy: Creating Proprietary Rights in Plant Genetic Resources, 2
J. INTELL. PROP. L. 141, 144 (1994). Developed countries have pursued heavily funded bio-
technological research programs, and developing countries feel the "escalating flow" of ge-
netic materials and data from "gene rich but technology poor countries of the South to
gene-poor but technology-rich countries of the North." Id. For example, in the United
States, plant genetic resources from the "South" contribute $500 million per year to the
wheat crop. Id.
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with Farmers' Rights and allows for legal protection of patented
seed varieties.98 Quantifying the South's contribution to seed de-
velopment, and determining how to collect and distribute compen-
sation, however, remain unresolved issues. With the exception of
the FAO undertaking and the Biodiversity Convention, Farmers'
Rights and Indigenous Communities' Rights have not achieved
overt recognition in other international dealings, such as trade
agreements like the GATT. Because the GATT strengthens the
intellectual property rights of the plant breeding industry, many
Southern nations have questioned the commitment of the North to
the Undertaking. s s
The third annex, adopted in 1991, reaffirmed the concept of
"common heritage," however the concept was made subject to the
sovereign rights of nations over their plant genetic resources. 00
Thus, nation states have the right to determine how to preserve,
protect, and be compensated for innovation utilizing their native
plant genetic resources. The annex recognizes that countries of
origin have legal ownership of the plant genetic resources found
within their borders, and thus have the right to control the use of
and access to these materials. 10 The Biodiversity Convention's
preamble endorses this concept, affirming that "[s]tates have sov-
ereign rights over their own biological resources."102
A fourth revision to the Undertaking is currently underway,
and will occur in three stages. Stage I will integrate the annexes
and harmonize the Undertaking with the Biodiversity Conven-
tion. Many developing countries have suggested that the Under-
taking adhere strictly to the Biodiversity Convention. The United
States has suggested that, while this would be beneficial, the
North may not be able to guarantee compensation. At the First
Extraordinary Session of the FAO Commission which occurred in
98 See Interpretation of the International Undertaking, supra note 91 (recognizing farm-
ers' rights are to be preserved).
99 See David Hurlbut, Fixing The Biodiversity Convention: Toward a Special Protocol for
Related Intellectual Property, 34 NAT. RESOURCES J. 379, 382-06 (1994) (discussing gap in
cultures, conflicts in ethics, and inequalities in economic standing between North and
South).
100 Id. (discussing purpose of patents and intellectual property rights in preventing ex-
ploitation of commercial ideas without fair compensation to originators).
101 See Odek, supra note 97, at 150-59 (providing summary of argument concerning ac-
cess to plant genetic resources).
102 See generally Kadidal, supra note 5, at 223 (discussing patents in pharmaceutical
markets). But see Odek, supra note 97, at 177 (proposing vesting proprietary rights to plant
genetic resources in customary groups and communities).
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November 1994, United States spokesperson Henry Shands
stated that, "[t]he international community cannot be in a position
to ensure benefits. We can support but cannot necessarily ensure
benefits."10 3
Stage II of the fourth revision will discuss how to enforce Farm-
ers' Rights and ensure equitable access to plant genetic resources.
Finally, Stage III will consider making the Undertaking a legally
binding agreement, such as a protocol to the Biodiversity Conven-
tion. A great deal of germplasm utilized by plant breeders of the
North originated in the South, therefore, developing nations have
a key role to play in ensuring the fourth revision addresses their
concerns about access to and control over their native plants.
In the fourth revision, representatives of developing countries
are seeking regulation of access to plant genetic resources through
an international forum such as the Biodiversity Convention. Such
a clarification and realization of Farmers' Rights and technology
transfer will encourage the conservation and sustainable use of
plant genetic resources for food and agriculture.
Since the undertaking relies on the "common heritage" princi-
ple, it is necessary to ensure the rights of farmers and indigenous
communities, both of which have traditionally understood the
value and utility of plant genetic resources. 10 4 Specifically, these
communities should somehow receive compensation for their
knowledge of plant genetic properties. The conservation of bi-
odiverse resources and numerous products-primarily therapeu-
tic or medicinal-has resulted from this knowledge and has
brought significant uncompensated profit to multinational phar-
maceutical companies located in the North.10 5
103 See PRG Undertaking Gets First Reading, South-North Development Monitor, Nov.
15, 1994.
104 See Shiraz Sidhva, World Trade News: Patents Plans 'Sow Seeds of Destruction' -
Warnings of the Consequences of Copyright Draft, FiN. TIMEs, July 23, 1993, at 6 (arguing
multinational corporations are appropriating seeds and plant varieties which have tradi-
tionally belonged to developing nations).
105 See id. (stating that cancer drug, Vincristine, was developed in Madagascar, but
country derives no benefit from Vincristine's million-dollar market); see also Odek, supra
note 97, at 145-47 (providing examples of unidirectional and uncompensated appropriation
of plant genetic resources which raise issues of "secondary use" of inventive steps). See
generally RIcHARD E. SHuLTEs, THE FUTURE OF PLANTS AS SOURCES OF NEW BIODYNAMIc
COMPOUNDS iN PLANTS iN THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN MEDICINE 103, 105 (Tony Swain
ed., 1972) (stating that 25% of all United States prescriptions in 1967 were for drugs whose
principle agents were higher plants).
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The Undertaking and related events have provided nongovern-
mental organizations (NGOs) a unique opportunity to respond in a
manner that empowers citizens, indigenous communities, and
farmers throughout the world. Many NGOs, including the Rural
Advancement Foundation International (RAFI) and Genetic Re-
sources Action International (GRAIN), have already participated
in meetings with the FAO Commission. For example, prior to the
1992 Rio Earth Summit, the Keystone Symposia brought together
governmental, nongovernmental, and academic participants to
explore the question of preserving the world's plant genetic re-
sources. This group of forty-one individuals from twenty-two
countries concluded that the current situation calls for a Global
Initiative for the Security and Sustainable Use of Plant Genetic
Resources. 10 6 Likewise, the Crucible Group, made up of intergov-
ernmental officials, NGOs, and industry representatives, has been
working to identify the trends, concerns, and opportunities related
to intellectual property issues relevant to plant breeding and
plant genetic resources.10
7
In June 1996, government officials and NGOs met in Leipzig,
Germany for the Fourth International Technical Conference on
Plant Genetic Resources. Two major documents were discussed:
the First Report on the State of the World's Plant Genetic Re-
sources (Report), and the Global Plan of Action (GPA). The Report
is a critical assessment of the status of the world's plant genetic
resources, and the multilateral institutional capacity to preserve
and develop these resources. The GPA is a combination of recom-
mended programs, priorities, and projects to conserve and to de-
velop plant genetic resources. Envisioned as a major component
of the FAO's contribution to the implementation of the Biodivers-
ity Convention, the GPA also addresses means of compensating
developing countries for their native germplasm and promotes on-
106 Keystone International Dialogue Series on Plant Genetic Resources, Final Consensus
Report: Global Initiative for the Security and Sustainable Use of Plant Genetic Resources,
Third Plenary Sess., Oslo, Norway (May 31-June 4, 1991).
107 See generally THE CRUcIBLE GROUP, PEoPLE,, PLANTs AND PATENTs (1994) (examining
major issues regarding intellectual property and implications on plant life and environ-
ment in general). The Crucible Group constitutes the widest cross-section of sociopolitical
perspectives and agricultural experience that has ever been assembled to hammer out
ideas and recommendations on the subject of intellectual property. Id. It includes grass-
roots organizers working with small-scale or subsistence farmers, agricultural research
scientists and science managers, intellectual property specialists, trade diplomats, and ag-
ricultural policy analysts, from both South and North and both government and industry.
Id.
1996] INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND BIODIVERSITY 453
farm use and development of genetic resources. 0 8 In order to fa-
cilitate NGO participation in this process, the FAO has estab-
lished the International Conference and Programme for Plant Ge-
netic Resources (ICPPGR), which will coordinate activities and
develop a range of initiatives and agreements designed to gener-
ate consensus and commitment for implementing the Leipzig con-
ference results.10 9
CONCLUSION
The FAO's International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Re-
sources and the Convention on Biological Diversity establish im-
portant principles regarding the protection of biodiversity while
recognizing the vast commercial value of germplasm. The recent
expansion of international trade agreements, however, establish-
ing a global regime of intellectual property rights, creates incen-
tives which may destroy biodiversity, while undercutting social
and economic development opportunities as well as cultural diver-
sity. Presently, countries are under pressure to change their IPR
laws to conform with the TRIPs agreement of the GATT. Such
rules will supersede national laws and allow privatization of the
world's knowledge and resources. The ability of companies to gain
monopolies over formerly freely available community resources,
including seeds, plants, and even micro-organisms, may have dev-
astating effects on both human communities and the protection of
biodiversity.
108 See Pesticide Action Network, Preparations for Plant Genetic Resources Action Plan,
PANUPS, May 8, 1995 [hereinafter Preparations for Plant Genetic Resources]; see also
Sidhva, supra note 104, at 6 (stating that developing nations' rights to native germplasm,
such as rice technology developed in China and palm oil research in Mayaysia, must be
protected). See generally VANDANA SHIVA, THE VIOLENCE OF THE GREEN REVOLUTION 186-87(1991) (illustrating difference between germplasm as "product" and germplasm as "raw ma-
terial" in value-added context).109 See Preparations for Plant Genetic Resources, supra note 108; Report: International
Technical Conference on Plant Genetic Resources, Leipzig, Germany, FOOD AND AGRICUL-
TURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, Rome, Italy (June 17-23 1996).

